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EPILOGUE
Dark soundings – towards a phenomenology of night*

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> Though in many of its aspects this visible world
> seems formed in love, the invisible spheres
> were formed in fright.
> Herman Melville (1977:354)

The protagonist of Salman Rushdie's novel, "Midnight's children" (1982), is born at midnight, the stroke of midnight, not any midnight, but the mid-night that colours his soul with the ambiguity of one replete with individual agency, yet devoid of it, caught by the clock that tick-tocks him into life, a life bound to that of India, born at that self-same stroke. These are his opening words:

> I was born in the city of Bombay [...] once upon a time. No, that won't do, there's no getting away from the date: I was born in Doctor Narlikar's Nursing home on August 15th, 1947. And the time? The time matters too. Well then: at night. No, it's important to be more [...]. On the stroke of midnight, as a matter of fact [...]. Oh, spell it out, spell it out: at the precise instant of India's arrival at independence, I tumbled forth into the world [...] I had been mysteriously handcuffed to history, my destinies indissolubly chained to those of my country (Rushdie 1982:9).

Rushdie's protagonist tumbles forth, from the deep darkness of foetal slumber into darkness, that of night, awakening in blackness lit with human illumination, at the moment of midnight, to be stretched thereafter on the rack of consciousness between night and day. At midnight, the cusp of before and after, of going and coming, thereafter uncertain of his toing and froing, yet as he says, handcuffed to history, dragged along its trajectories, great structures and tiny ones braided together, the micro and macro synchronised in their rhythms as the dark recedes and the light dawns, rises. In English, night always falls, never rises; day always breaks, never falls. Night, for that matter, falls upon day, and there is something predatory in this, for day cannot resist this heavy onslaught, its ocularcentric horizons shut down, dimmed, blinded, made inchoate, the trajectories of people through its landscapes, its dayscapes, amputated, curtailed, hidden. Day breaks, shattering, as poets say, the shackles of night, the enclosing silence of sleep, as rising light, light in its rising, illuminates anew expanding horizons of human trajectories within dayscapes. The human body too falls with night, falls

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into the horizontal, falls into itself, into sleep, into stillness, into non-consciousness, into the sensuous trajectories of elsewhere, elsewhen. The body rising with light, into the vertical, into consciousness, into opening horizons, into lengthening perception, into expanding movement, into outward trajectories towards others. Darkness is associated with the primal, light with the social.

Midnight, the moment of deep darkness, within which night embraces, covers, and penetrates the human being, outwardly sealing the eyes if they are open, opening the eyes deeply inward if they are closed and sleeping. For Rushdie's protagonist within mid-night, the words 'once upon a time', the story-telling formula that obviates space and time, will not suffice to index the moment when the day-night (through the day into the night) is folding into the night-day (through the night into the day), as the nocturnal travels into the diurnal, the new day of personal and social horizons opening outwards, illuminating distance and depth, within which human trajectories are traced by light on light, with intimations of shadow and dusk, of the night-day travelling into the day-night. Journeying further and deeper into the day-night, each of us enters (and is entered by) radically different dimensions of being, as nightness seeps within us.[1] In English, night, unlike day, is rarely called new, nor is night, unlike day, called old. Linear time as we experience it during the day-time may be entirely suspended during sleep, while non-linearity pulsates within us.

These are themes of phenomenal existence, of horizons and trajectories of experience, altering radically in changing light, that form one basis for a social phenomenology of night. This is what I discuss here. Burkhard Schnepel and Eyal Ben-Ari comment in their Introduction on the paucity of anthropological studies of night. The editors address, to a degree, the question of why this is so. Their position is strengthened when we consider yet another glaring lacuna of the same order, the absence of thinking on night and darkness among phenomenologists, with their close kinship to the studies within this illumining collection. Phenomenology, experiential, existential, ignores darkness and extols lucidity, embracing, theorising the visible whose presence speaks for itself within consciousness, or, if beyond consciousness, then grounded in the experience of it. Yet night and darkness are no less phenomenal than any other phenomena.

This absence is not only due to the taken-for-granted qualities of night and darkness, as Steger and Brunt (2003b) intimate. As night falls upon day, people, their movements, and many of the places they move into and through become more inaccessible to research by anthropologists. Researchers themselves may become more stranger-like in the dark. Also, night-time sociality may cohere especially within highly specialised

1 Brigitte Steger and Lodewijk Brunt (2003a:5) argue that it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish clearly between day and night, invoking twilight and dawn as periods that belong to neither. However, my argument is that the life-world is predicated on the movement between day and night, a movement that has intentionality and direction, hence from day-night into night-day, unfolding and traversing twilight and dawn.

settings, to which Beatrix Hauser's ethnography of an Orissan goddess festival and Karine Tinat's analysis of Madrid night-club interaction all attest. These points are not merely practical: the very sensuousness of darkness drives people to relate differently, perhaps radically so, to space, time and others. And even more so, of course, when people are asleep, apparently absent from the social (though the very presence of their sleeping bodies is undeniably social for those who are awake, and likely subliminally so for those who are sleeping).

Phenomenology and anthropology are enlightenment projects dedicated to the cogito of life-worlds in modernity, however leavened by the sensuous. These are disciplines more dedicated than not to the lucidity of comprehension, which shows itself clearly to the analytic eye (and suspicious of ideas that curve out of sight, perceived as hiding within them the fanciful, as darkness tends to do). The intellect of modernity banished the root metaphor of darkness, or relegated it to the devolving past; while sleepiness, even today, is identified with the soporific, with a slovenly, dank, ignorant mind, one hardly seeing the light of day.[2] These points merge well with Brigitte Steger's analysis of the ideology of early rising, emphasising social control and duties, as Japan thrust into capitalism.

Wilhelm Aubert and Harrison White (1968:329–330) argue that the diurnal cycle, at least in western moral and social orders, has powerful analogies, perhaps homologies, with the life cycle, but also with historical and ahistorical process. The human being is born, matures, grows old and dies primarily on diurnal grounds (or so it feels from an awake perspective).[3] Rushdie's protagonist, born on the cusp between the day-night and the night-day, teeters precariously, always in danger of falling backward into chaos while being borne forward inexorably towards the chasms of unfolding existence – experientially, borne forward indeed, into day-time. Day-time has cumulative properties: the perception of self and other as growing and ageing refers more to day-time than to night-time (Aubert and White 1968:330). Night-time, especially sleep-time, has non-cumulative properties, an experiential withdrawal from phenomenal processes of growth and ageing. From this perspective the human being usually lives existence from day to day (rather than night to night), and though every such micro-cycle is a repetition, it is in Deleuzian (1994) terms no less a new beginning. Yet this beginning depends on the death of light, on sleep, on experiencing non-linear, non-cumulative time, before re-entering the linear and the cumulative. Born at midnight, Rushdie's protagonist is in a metaphysical way deprived of sleep, of dreaming, and so he, and the state with which he is twinned, live linear time surrealistically, their

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2 Dominique Laporte (1993:84) argues that, just as the European Enlightenment highlighted the visual, it relegated the olfactory to the shadows, identifying it with obscurantism.

3 The awake perspective is not to be taken lightly. Aubert and White (1968:335) maintain that, '[f]rom the point of view both of the evolution of species which has led to man and that of the evolution of individual men with age, it is not sleep that needs to be explained but wakefulness [...]. The wakefulness of choice found in adult man is a new biological development'.

waking lives full of the fantastic. All of the above begs for a more phenomenological perspective on nightness within anthropology, one that joins the phenomenal to the social, and both to space and time.[4]

Horizon and trajectory

Thinking of night as a phenomenon might begin with elementary ideas of planes of human movement and synchronisation in the life-world. Phenomenologists commonly write of the everyday, not of the everynight life-world (Schutz and Luckman 1973:21). Yet the task is to begin thinking of the (neologistic) everynight, perhaps by contrasting this with the everyday. For this, at a minimum, we need ideas of horizon and trajectory, or others similar to these. A dictionary definition will do to define the plane of horizon in the everyday: 'The circular line where the sky and the earth seem to meet, called the apparent, sensible, or visible horizon, as distinguished from the great circle parallel to it called the celestial... or true horizon, the centre of which is the centre of the earth, the boundary of one's mental vision, experiences, etc' (Hayward and Sparkes 1982:563). Though ocularcentric and diecentric, this definition is useful, since it draws into one vector embodied vision and the limits of perception.

Alfred Shutz and Thomas Luckmann (1973:148, 193), following Husserl, argue that every grasping of phenomena (without which there is no social existence) necessarily has a horizon of experience. Every phenomenon grasped also has its interior horizon, the inner details that are perceived to constitute the phenomenon. In the daytime world of persons embodying themselves more in vertical planes, these horizons of experience are contained in yet more comprehensive vertical fields (Todes 2001:104), in the sense of the saying, 'The sky's the limit', signifying the potential absence of limit. The existence of a horizon and its verticality – sensible, mental, experiential – enable perspective, our capacity to orientate ourselves as social beings to the four dimensions, to others, to place, to movement through them and to them. These orientations enable our intentionality, since this is an attitude towards others, towards things, towards space, through time. Without intentionality, we can hardly relate to direction within the life-world. Our intentionalities move us towards others, towards relating to them in intentional (though often vague) ways. Intentionality enables our having projects; and projects enable reality-testing, whereby we perceive, somaticize, and embody the shaping of our contacts and relationships.

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4 A phenomenology of those things that share 'darkness' could take vivid direction from Herman Melville's (1977) masterly metaphorization of whiteness, the whiteness of the whale, the qualities of which cannot be addressed directly, reductively, positivistically. An exemplar for a possible phenomenology of darkness and the senses is Serematakis' (1996:26–29) discussion of the textures of feeding the child in Greece, through which baking, tasting, passage and exchange are woven together into an awakening, an identification, a binding of the senses, braided into embodied memory.

The plane of trajectory may be defined, again by the dictionary, as the path described by a projectile under the action of given forces. If we speak of social and personal trajectories, then these are the resolutions of forces – embodied intentionality, attitude, project – as these are traced through actions of persons in relation to their horizons. In the day-time these trajectories, by and large, move outwards, from the person, among persons. These forces obtain the resolution of their trajectories in relation to the perspectival horizons of possibility and potentiality that map changing life-worlds. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962:68, 102) implies that there would be no horizon round and beyond persons 'unless they partook of the same kind of being', unless their gaze could identify similar or overlapping points in these horizons, thereby identifying interactive trajectories of movement. Interaction is constituted by the trajectories of persons towards the same or similar points in shared or overlapping horizons of possibility. The relationship of person and life-world has cybernetic qualities, a point to which I shall return below.

The situational or positional identity of the person is realised through her or his trajectories. So, horizons are personally social, socially personal. In any event, in the day-time life-world, trajectories and their horizons usually have social components. However, Schutz and Luckmann (1973:167) comment that, '[t]he temporally, spatially, and socially arranged horizons of every actual experience or situation in general extend in the direction of decreasing familiarity, determinateness, and credibility. They point to distant horizons of relative opacity [...]', to regions of the life-world unfamiliar and undetermined. Thus a potential of every known trajectory – personal, social – in the day-time world is the emergence of the unknown, the unpredictable.

Night horizons

What happens to the horizons and trajectories constituting the day-time life-world when night falls onto day and darkness squeezes itself out of daylight? We find clues in Kobo Abe's "The box man" (1974), a novel of social separation and alienation set in modern Tokyo. In his apartment, Abe's protagonist begins living in a corrugated cardboard box that his refrigerator came in. He folds the bottom part inward, making it into a shelf. Cutting the observation window into the box enables him to see a few feet in front, though he has difficulty in looking upwards through the window. Over the window he affixes a curtain so no one can see in, leaving a vertical slit for him to see out. Bent wires stuck into the box sides become hooks on which to hang things: radio, mug, thermos, flashlight, towel.

The box becomes his home, its interior furnished with his sparse belongings, within easy reach. One day the man puts on the box and leaves. Body and box become more and more congruent, a micro-world turned onto and into itself. With time the outside of the box still looks like a cardboard container, yet,

> when you look at it from within its a labyrinth of a hundred interconnecting puzzle rings. The more you struggle the more the box, like an extra outer skin growing from the body, creates new twists for the labyrinth, making the inner disposition increasingly more complex (1974:178).

The box man's horizon is radically foreshortened. Apart from his narrow view of the world, the limits of his sight (and touch) nearly press up against his face and body, and he lives in a micro-world of permanent dusk. His intentionality and projects are minimal, his trajectories of living nearly curtailed, without depth, almost without life. Within the box, his body is virtually isomorphic with the nearness of his horizon and the non-distance his tiny trajectories. The exterior of the box exists before a vast unknown. The box man's life-world is nearly devoid of possibility, without movement, though he walks the streets, since his horizon and trajectories barely change.

Wearing the box is something like donning a mask, reducing stimuli to the senses, a form of sensory deprivation (Handelman n.d.). Experiments with extreme sensory deprivation demonstrate the speed with which individuals in these conditions begin generating interior worlds even as their exterior ones are shut down. In extreme sensory deprivation, the individual curls and whorls wholly within himself, re-forming through the creation of imaginary horizons. From an exterior viewpoint we call these hallucinations, since they lack the reality of self-other trajectories and perspectives. Something similar occurs to the box man. Entering the dusk of the box, he draws further into himself, within horizons that share qualities with those of night. The box man may be mad or becomes mad within his box, yet as the thinking of R.D. Laing (1960), Thomas Szasz (1961) and others (e.g. Esterson 1970) suggests, this too indexes the florescence of alternative, horizons and trajectories, though within the individual.

There are, then, social darkscapes within the day-time world, just as there are social lightscapes within the night-time world, as the studies of Hauser and Tinat tell us. In this respect, Adriënne Heijnen's article is especially intriguing, in her telling of the fragile coexistence of southern Icelanders with the 'hidden people' and with the returning dead, and I shall return to this. In scale, the overlapping or interpenetration of darkscapes and lightscapes are both macro and micro. Schnepel and Ben-Ari discuss how, historically, night was domesticated by light in European communities. It is worth pointing out that in early modern Europe masking was often forbidden in urban spaces, even during carnival (Burke 1978). Sedition was thought to lurk under the mask. The covering, the mask, forms a space of social darkness between mask and face, an inaccessible space concealing identity and intentionality, thereby hiding the horizons of the masker and making his trajectories mysterious. In a strange way the Madrid clubbers take on masks of light in the darkness, exposing identities that the participants cannot or prefer not to wear during the day. And they, of course, then go to sleep, to dream: masking as a prelude to dreaming, dreaming perhaps continuing masking by other means. But lightscapes in darkness are not simply illuminating the night: light

becomes another kind of masking of what takes shape in the dark, and so is more the concealing of this than its revealing.

How to get at the sensuous properties of horizons and trajectories of night? One way is to look for darkscapes in the day, spaces of social and personal darkness, like those of the box man, the sensorily deprived, the masker, using their properties to think about those of night. The presence of daylight darkscapes is a major point of Heijnen's contribution, alerting us to the significance of cultural perceptions of dark and light. One especially pertinent example of looking for darkscapes in daylight is Edith Wyschogrod's (1985) thinking on death-worlds of the twentieth century, particularly those of the Nazi concentration camp. Wyschogrod's ground, her existential template, is the life-world in which the natural attitude, its intentionality, and the horizons and trajectories these generate are orientated to living. The predicate of the death-world reverses the semeiosis of the life-world.

The death-world uses the signs of the life-world but reverses their values, so that the natural attitude and intentionality of the death-world produce trajectories leading to death, killing the living one way or another. Death is intended to fill all horizons of those on their way to death. People exist to cease existing. Primo Levi (1988) delineates so well how the materia of the death-world seem on their surfaces to be integral parts of the life-world, yet instead of enabling the living to live, they drive them to death. The intentionality of the death-world is to shut down horizons, to amputate trajectories, dimming and dehumanising the interiors and exteriors of the living, so that they die inside and outside themselves, first in life and then in death, without opening other, alternative dimensions of experience. The extreme instance in the camps was the *musulmann*, the living-dead, so called because all passion for living had been driven from him (Agamben 1999). Physiologically alive, he was dessicated and dead, privately, socially, thereby embodying the dead-ending trajectories of the death-world.

All of this suggests the (at least partial) validity in using the day-world as a ground through which to explore the night-world, at least as darkness comes, but perhaps also into the deep night. The darkness of night radically alters horizons depending on sight; changing perceptions and conceptions of existing, navigating, interrelating. Within blackness, social horizons dim, and so, too, the relative clarity that otherness has in daylight. The physical horizon contracts, perspective is acutely foreshortened, trajectory becomes more limited, curving inwardly more, into physical closeness, intimacy, interiority. The polychromatic, in daylight setting off and solidifying place and its contours as 'over there' rather than 'here' (Straus 1966), becomes more monochromatic, as 'thereness', moving towards us, becomes the immediacy of 'hereness'. The nightscape contrarily makes the person more discontinuous with his surroundings yet forces him into more immediate contact with them. Emmanuel Levinas (1987:118) makes the point that our eyes and ears are sensuously tactile. Though it becomes more difficult to perceive the surround in the dark, yet this presses in from all sides, so highly proximate, the so-called palpability of darkness, from which the person cannot separate.

Darkness, one can say, is sticky, clinging continuously; or, perhaps its tactility flows around us like waters of the sea depth. Paraphrasing Levinas, the proximity of darkness is not reducible to the experience of proximity. Darkness drives us inward, opening into other dimensions of existence.

For example, I think that light and dark affect body image in self-narration. In daylight the person is more outside the ongoing self-narrative she tells herself, and in consequence her body-image is larger in relation to her life-story (see Young 2000). In darkness, she enters into her own story more, her body-image becoming smaller, more vulnerable. Contiguities – of persons, of persons and place, of bodies coming together – come more to the fore in darkness, as do the senses depending on closeness, their stimuli approaching and penetrating us: the olfactory, the auditory, the tactile. As already noted, two articles in this collection focus on pools of light encapsulating their own illuminations in darkness: Madrid clubbers, and women in Orissa worshipping their goddess, herself with powerful affinities to the night (or perhaps to the night-day that follows mid-night), coming closer and closer to her presence as they embrace her qualities of nightness and she grips them, directly or not. Yet even public spaces lit in the night are full of shadows, dim corners, quite different qualities of light, the presence of darkness.

The absence of light in the night opens more to other dimensions of reality, to other beings, indeed to other otherness. The Icelandic dead, the Orissan goddess, and in a way no less powerful, the military pharmorg discussed by Ben-Ari, come at us from other dimensions, often beyond human ken. Night, effacing so many visible distinctions, makes it difficult for most human beings to navigate easily without aids; yet night is, phenomenally, the medium most proximate (apart from the liquid) to the human body. Its tactile presence enveloping and embracing, night is the medium that banishes the 'thereness' of horizon, so that the 'hereness' of otherness (and the beings who live in this otherness) come to us with such immediacy.

Darkness pressing against us drives us inwards and, entering into us more deeply, finally we sleep and dream, opening into micro-worlds with strange horizons within which the laws of the social world hold not, in which the familiar selfness of the person curves back into him, yet filling him with otherness. During sleep the person is, above all, in-place in the exterior world, and in-movement in her interior world. The strangeness that darkness brings to the social world is brought into the interior of the individual, asleep and dreaming. What happens outside the individual happens inside the individual: the opening into other dimensions approaching people, into which they enter. Hence the common belief around the world that the soul travels elsewhere during sleep.[5] Experiments interrupting sleep during rapid eye movement (REM), a sign

[5] Alan Hobson (1999:40), among others, comments that a sense of movement (he writes of the 'illusion of movement') is common to all dreams. The contributors to Lohmann (2003) explore dream travel in cultures of the western Pacific.

of dreaming, demonstrate that we must dream to remain sane.[6] To be prevented from dreaming is a form of extreme sensory deprivation (as all good torturers know). Well-being seems to depend on the processing of information from exterior stimuli while awake and interior stimuli while asleep, the human being turning on a full axis of awareness, outside-in and inside-out time and again.

In his contribution, Schnepel argues that the significance of dreaming differs radically between western and non-western cultures. While in the former, dreaming is significant for the individual dreamer; in the latter its significance is more social, relevant to a broader constituency, and here the politics of dreaming has especial importance. Part of Schnepel's argument can be taken in a somewhat different direction. The politics of dreaming was given particular value in cultures organised more holistically, such that (as Heijnen argues to a degree for southern Iceland) there was continuity between day and night, between cosmic principles and social practices. In these social orders, again to a degree, social relationships may have been valued above or as quite different from the empirical individuals who composed them (see Dumont 1970). In such cultures there was less of any absolutist, monothetic divisions between deities and human beings, but instead more continuous gradations in contact with one another, actually, potentially. Monothetic divisions are absolutist, honing distinctions in terms of the black-and-white attributes of either/or (see Bowker and Star 1999). Without monothetic compartments to catch and contain the relevance of dreams, their significance spread, as did the politics of dreaming.

Modern capitalist and bureaucratic social orders have profoundly developed the ideology of the individual as an autonomous, moral, social unit (Dumont 1977, Rose 1989) and, so too, theories of dream analysis in which the individual agent is made responsible for his dreams. These index his personal worries and obsessions and are consequential first and foremost privately, to himself, for himself. In these modern social orders, day is distinguished more monothetically from night, and so it follows that night can (and should) be invaded and colonised by day. The monothetic division of day from night is brought out powerfully in Steger's discussion of how rising into the day is ideally ritualised, step by step, in today's Japan. People should first clean and prepare their exteriors, their interface with the day, with others, then eat, filling and preparing their interiors, thus intrafacing with themselves. Fully activated in the day mode, outside and inside, they may have their passive ears filled with encouraging

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6 The correlation between REM sleep and the subjective experience of dreaming was discovered during the 1950s (see Dement and Kleitman 1957). Arguments over dreaming during REM and non-REM sleep have become something of a *cause celebre* in research on the neurophysiology of sleep. Hobson (1999) argues that since REM sleep is associated only with brainstem functions and dreaming is associated with REM sleep, dreaming cannot have the symbolic and psychological significance attributed to it by Freud and, by now, a multitude of other writers. However, Mark Solms (1995, 1997, 2000) argues persuasively that dreaming also occurs outside of REM sleep and that, moreover, forebrain chemistry is critical to all dreaming.

speeches relating them to broader social horizons. Within these horizons, they actively exercise trajectories embodying them together as socialised and synchronised social beings.

Schnepel leans to some sort of dialectics predicated on the day/night distinction. Heijnen inclines more to continuities between darkness and light, as does, I think, Hauser. Steger, as already noted, highlights the clean-cut separation of day from night, as does Tinat. Here I want to point out some implications of taking these positions by joining systemics to the embryonic phenomenology I have outlined briefly and relating these implications to the colonisation of the night.

If we conceptualise the relationship between day and night as an open-ended dialectic, in the processual Hegelian sense of thesis and antithesis, then what will be the synthesis, the thesis to come, that will interact with its own antithesis? If we persist with such dialectics in traditional cultural orders, then processuality will need to be modified in the direction of social reproduction rather than Hegelian change (Handelman 1998:107–112). Open-ended dialectics are not the condition of darkness and light in the *jatra* of Budhi Thakurani, for her powers intensify with the night, as does their benefice for her female devotees. Nor are traditional relationships of dreaming and waking those of open-ended dialectics, apart from the very loose sense of give-and-take between them, the conditions of what Schnepel calls the politics of dreaming.

Perhaps of greater relevance to conceptualising the relationships of night and day would be a more systemic position, like that outlined by Gregory Bateson (1972). With regard to dreaming, Bateson (1972:134) argued that important sorts of information are inaccessible to conscious inspection, and for the well-being of human beings it is crucial that this remains so, since 'the cybernetic nature of self and the world tends to be imperceptible to consciousness' (1972:444). Thus, if lineal, conscious, 'rational' structures are forced onto relationships between the human being and the life-world, we then 'become blind to the cybernetic circularities of the self and the external world;' instead we conflate 'arcs of circuits, cut off from their matrix', with the entirety of information (1972:445). This, by the way, gives us an idea of why we have to dream, to access hidden arcs of information, to remain sane; and so, why insomnia, the holding back from alternative realities, can be so destructive. Conflating arcs of circuits with the entirety of information is the equivalent of making the horizons and trajectories of sleep, of dreaming, virtual. The consequences are scary, even in the light of day. I am not saying that shifts between light and darkness are unproblematic, as other dimensions, other beings, come into play. The crossovers may be radically disjunctive, dangerous, requiring specialised cultural devices to accomplish safely, even when these chiasms (Merleau-Ponty 1968) are integral to daily routines.

This discussion of the cybernetics of consciousness is especially germane to what the editors, following Murray Melbin (1987), call the colonisation of the night. So, Madrid clubbers inhabit their islands of light within darkness, ceaselessly playing with

identities. Yet we are given one ironic example of what likely happens as colonisation proceeds apace. Heijnen discusses the hidden people, the invisible *huldufólk*, who are said to flee the relentless expansion of the built environment. During World War II, and then during the Cold War, Iceland was bound inextricably to the United States military and to NATO, indeed to globalise progress technology more generally, which turned the island into 'an electric rock in the North Atlantic' (Sigurdsson 2000:485). Moreover, 'progress talk' dominated much Icelandic discourse, including that of electrification. The *huldufólk* fled electrification, while the forgetting of the past induced by progress talk (Sigurdsson 1997:130) almost buried them. Yet despite their wholesale retreat, the hidden people live wherever a bit of the wild breaks through the cultivated surface: in knolls and rocks on farmland, and more recently in parks and gardens in and around the capital in the southwest. In its own way this is a cybernetic, mythic response to the invisible people linearized as arcs of circuits. The colonised, the local, complete their own circuit as they return to surreptitiously colonise their globalized colonisers.

The extreme example in this collection of colonising the night is that of the pharmorg, discussed futuristically by Ben-Ari. The pharmorg is pharmacologically designed to function in combat throughout day and night without falling prey to circadian rhythms. To the pharmorg of the future the night will be no more than a virtual reality; while he (and she) will be psycho-sculpted individually to fit as relatively sleepless micro-organisms within the cybernetic systems of the military. In this cybernetic ecology, non-consciousness will be held in abeyance for lengthy periods; and non-stop military operations will do away with the notion of the cybernetic circularities of self and world. Horizons and trajectories will be designed virtually (as they are now for bombing runs and missile strikes). The linearized, custom-designed soldier of the not-so-distant future will be product and reflection of what I call 'bureaucratic logic' (Handelman 2004).

Nonetheless, those responsible for these prodigious efforts at colonising the night would do well to consider a recent comment by Jean Baudrillard (2000:76): '[...] things discover us at the same time that we discover them [...]. At the moment when the subject discovers the object [...] the object makes a reversible, but never innocent, discovery of the subject'. Michael Polanyi (1958) writes of experience as something more than we can tell, Levinas of experience containing more than consciousness can hold at a given time. As the pharmorg turns the night, opening towards intimations of otherness and infinity, into the virtual, the linear, the rational, experiencing darkness may well uncover the vulnerabilities of the pharmorg. Despite the likely success of psycho-sculpting, one vulnerability may involve sleep. How will pharmorgs dream? Technologized colonisers of night will have to face the question posed by the title of Philip K. Dick's science-fiction classic "Do androids dream of electric sheep?" Now there's a conundrum for a phenomenology of night.

Throughout these musings I have used day as the ground for the extrapolation of

thoughts about night.[7] How does using day and its dayscapes as the phenomenal, experiential ground of night and nightscapes skew our understanding of night? If we think the distortion may be profound, how can we understand night more in its own terms, as we do day? If the phenomenal and experiential premises of night differ radically from those of day, can the study of night be entered through the lucid rationality, object-ness, and objectivity that fill the study of day with light? If not, what are the alternatives?

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7 As Bruce Kapferer (personal communication) pointed out to me.

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