

OBLITERATING THE “OTHER” IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

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The Diabolical Riddle

Georg Simmel has made this observation which I take to be my text for explication:

The degeneration of a difference in convictions into hatred and fight occurs only when there were essential similarities between the parties. The “respect for the enemy” is usually absent where the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity. And where enough similarities continue to make confusions and blurred outlines possible, points of difference need an emphasis not justified by the issue but only by that danger of confusion.¹

Many commentators on the so-called ethnic or ethnonationalist conflicts exploding in many parts of the globe – in Eastern Europe, Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Turkey, South Asia, Africa (most recently in Rwanda and Burundi), and in many other locations – have been deeply confused and shocked by two features.

One is the extreme brutality of the conflicts in which the attackers inflict extreme pain, mutilation, deprivation, and degradation on their victims. The other is that the assailants and victims who frequently reverse roles and are engaged in exchanges of violence are not strangers to one another. They have been neighbors in the loose sense of having lived in the same towns, resided intermixed or side by side in contiguous districts and in neighboring towns, for long periods of time, and have had transactions of various kinds. As Simmel has perceptively said, it is because of the sudden imposition of difference on the basis of previous solidarity and co-existence, and it is because of the “blurred” nature of the social landscape that perhaps an over-determined hatred and repudiation is unleashed in denial of “confusions” or lack of firm partitions between the antagonists. One might extend Simmel by saying that the greater the blurrings of and ambiguities between the socially constructed categories of difference, the greater the venom of the imposed boundaries, when conflict erupts, between the self and the other, “us” and “them.” No international military code of humane treatment of “prisoners of war” deriving from “respect for the enemy” regulates the conduct of Serb and Bosnian Muslim, Armenian and Azerbaijani, Hindu and Muslim in Kashmir, Sinhalese soldier and Tamil insurgent in Sri Lanka.

Can we push this process of creating and repudiating the intolerable “other” in current ethnonationalist conflict any further? Can we say that it is because that component of “sameness” that the ethnic enemy shares with you, and because already your enemy is part of you, that you must forcibly expel him or her from yourself, objectify him or her as the total other? Accordingly, that component of ‘difference’

1 Simmel 1955, Chapter 1.

from you, whether it be allegedly 'religious' or 'linguistic' or 'racial' is so exaggerated and magnified that this stereotyped "other" must be degraded, dehumanized, and compulsively obliterated?

I have previously referred to the sudden imposition of difference on the social space of previous co-existence. I have to offer some interpretation of the genesis and impulsion of this process. I shall try to provide this in the last section of this paper when I shall discuss the nationalizing and nation-making project, that leaders of ethno-nationalist movements espouse and champion, and how that project entails a problematic homogenising process inside one's own collectivity at the same time as it attributes an equally homogenising opposed identity to the "other" collectivity.

The former Yugoslavia is an apt site to visit to see the processes I have outlined. This extended quotation from Misha Glenny's "*The Fall of Yugoslavia*" suits our purpose:²

From the beginning of the conflict in Croatia, one question above most others has exercised minds inside and outside the country: what causes this depth of hatred which has provoked atrocities and slaughter on such a wide scale over such a short period of time? In retrospect, it seems clear that the wars of the Second World War did not end with Tito. The conflict inside Yugoslavia between 1941–5 assumed such bloody proportions that, were it ever to revive, it was always likely to be merciless. Even for those like myself who have observed not merely the war itself but the dense web of political intrigue which led to it, the extent or nature of the violence is beyond any framework of moral comprehension. Obviously, the conflict has been caused by complex historical and political forces. But the hatred has a slightly different origin. To a large degree, the wars of the Yugoslav succession have been nationalist in character. They are not ethnic conflicts, as the media would often have it, as most of those doing the killing are of the same ethnos. Indeed what is striking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, is just how closely related are the Serbs, the Croats, and the Moslems. Religion is the crucial factor dividing these people, although this is not a confessional conflict. For centuries these people have been asked to choose between competing empires and ideologies, which have invariably been defined by religion.

On occasions, great earthquakes have erupted along this powerful historical fault line. It is then that the Bosnians have been enlisted in the service of this or that great power. The Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Moslems have been adorned with many different cultural uniforms over the centuries by which they identify one another as the enemy when conflict breaks out. Despite this, underneath the dress they can see themselves reflected – it is this awful recognition that these primitive beasts on the other side of the barricade are their brothers which has led to the violence assuming such ghastly proportions in Bosnia. The only way that fighters can deal with this realization is to exterminate the opposite community. How else does one explain the tradition of facial mutilation in this region? How else can we account for the high incidence of women and children being killed in cold blood? The Orthodox, the Catholics or the Moslems can only claim victory when the heretics have been wiped out or expelled from their homes. Ceasefires brokered by the United Nations may come and go in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fighters on all three side will almost certainly ignore them. The Serbs will continue until they control 65 percent of Bosnian territory; Croat guns will not rest until western Herzegovina and Posavina have been integrated into Croatia; and despite the best attempts by the Serbs to exterminate them and the Croats to disenfranchise them politically, the Moslems will mount a guerrilla campaign against which the struggles in Northern Ireland and the Basque country will pale into insignificance. Historically, the only way to keep these people apart once the fighting begins has been for an outside power to intervene and offer its protection to all citizens, in particular, from imperial urges of Croatia and Serbia. History will judge whether the international community is able to rise to the mighty challenge posed by war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 Glenny 1992: 168–169.

Neighbors Turn Assailants in Croatia

The following examples dramatically illustrate how persons of different ethnic nationality who have lived in accommodation and amity speedily turn against one another, when carried by the tidal wave of ethnonationalist conflict.

The New York Times, dated July 31, 1991, contained this article in which certain Croat villagers of Struga, a rural community about 60 miles from Zagreb, the Croatian capital, are reported as describing "how their Serb neighbors rounded up dozens of their kinsmen four days ago [in late July 1991] and used them as human shields for a methodical march of death and destruction."

One of the victims of this violence, a Miss Melita Blazevic, 20 years old, described how the attack began in the morning "with an onslaught of mortar rounds, followed by the Serbs ... moving through the neighboring hamlet of Zamlaca, collecting hostages."

Miss Blazevic, who has a black eye and shattered teeth, said she was hiding in her home at the outskirts of Struga when the Serbs kicked down the door. Outside, she saw the flatbed truck with the machine gun bolted to its floor. Her 24-year-old brother, Zdravko, had long since left the house to join in the firefight.

"Almost all of them were schoolmates, the people with whom I used to meet for drinks," she said of the Serbs. "I told them, 'You are garbage.' They asked me, 'Where is your brother?' I said, 'I don't know.' And they started to beat me."

"One started to beat me with his pistol on my face," she continued. "When he broke three teeth – he was standing on my left side – I directly blew my teeth out. He said, 'Why are you spitting at me?'"³

The skirmish in Struga was part of a broad offensive on Friday and Saturday that saw Serbian rebels push the Croats from a number of villages south of Zagreb. Struga, home to about 200 people, is on the edge of a predominantly Serbian area that has declared its independence from Croatia and calls itself Krajina.

According to Miss Blazevic the hostages were to make "a human wall," behind which the Serb assailants placed themselves, and the procession moved forward, the hostages being prodded by knives and gun butts, toward the Croatian police who were trying to maintain authority in a region of Croatia where Serbs outnumber Croats: "The police defenders were reportedly paralyzed by the sight of their families held hostage and did not return fire."

Another informant, Maria Kizevic, who gave her age as over 60, said she knew nearly all of the assailants from her years of work at the local school. Mrs. Kizevic said she was terrified by the initial artillery barrage, and gave up counting the sounds of exploding mortar rounds after reaching 257 in one hour.

It is noteworthy that not only had the assailants and victims, Serbs and Croats, lived together and knew one another, but also that the witnesses commented on the suddenness of the ethnic divide and violence that had engulfed them:

The villagers seemed bewildered by the speed with which hatred has overwhelmed all other feelings between local Serbs and Croats. Several said Predrag Orlovic, a Serb who has openly boasted of cutting Croatian policemen's throats, only last year shared a combine with his Croatian neighbors to bring in the harvest.

3 Engelberg 1991. All quotations are taken from this report.

Serbs and Croats: From Coexistence to Enmity and Annihilation

Glenny provides us with a vivid reporting of how the *narod*, the ordinary people of a region called Krajina, where the town of Knin is located, became fatally fractured in ethnonationalist terms. Although Krajina was officially within Croatia, yet the majority of the local population were Serbs, and in Knin itself the Croats were definitely a minority.

Before May 1991, according to Glenny, the local Croats and Serbs “lived in contentment in this and other regions.” They would not have dreamed at that time that it might be possible “that Croat soldiers would massacre innocent Serbs, while Serb fighters would mutilate innocent Croats.”

This is how Glenny narrates what had befallen Knin in the space of one year since he had visited it in 1990.

When I first arrived in Knin, although the *narod* was being prepared for the forthcoming events, this had not yet affected the everyday friendships of Serbs and Croats. Later on during the war, I witnessed how the tightest and oldest personal bonds were slashed into ribbons by the blades of hate and prejudice. But it was a gun-carrying, Ustasha-hating Serb who put me in touch with his old Croat friends in Knin when I first travelled there. “Most of the Croats in Knin are fine people,” he explained. “They’re not like those dreadful Ustasas in Split.” I developed a friendship with the Croat family whose fate is now a mystery to me. Even by 1990, it had become clear to me that in Croatia one’s nationality was not important. The only fact of significance for individuals in Croatia was whether they were members of the local minority or not. In Knin, the Croats were definitely a minority. Although the fabric of their life was still intact, my Croat family did explain how their thirty-year-old son had been warned to stay away from public places and, indeed, to consider leaving Knin lest the Martićevci, as the Krajina Militia was labelled, should try and mobilize him.

It was through these Croats that I uncovered a network of Serbs in Knin who believed that Babić was driving them to a senseless war. These were relatively sophisticated Serbs from Knin who protested in particular against Babić’s methods in organizing the referendum and the *straća*. They described how the followers of Babić and Martić would knock on the door of recalcitrant Serb males at all hours to demand why they had failed to volunteer for duty on the *straća*. They painted a convincing picture of the general fear which Babić had created to guarantee his order. They also explained how Babić’s most faithful people came not from Knin itself but from the surrounding villages. Although I was convinced by these men’s story, I am similarly convinced that Babić could have survived in Knin without resorting to such crude totalitarian methods, as support for him in the town was substantial.

I visited Knin once after the war had begun. The house of my Croat friends had been taken over by Serb refugees from somewhere on the Dalmatian coast who had prominently replaced the Croat names with their own written in Cyrillic, and although I succeeded in briefly meeting one of the Serb dissidents of eighteen months earlier, his commitment was now one of unquestioning and genuine loyalty to Babić. It was as though the whole town had suffered the fate of the American mid-west town featured in Don Segal’s film *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*: some alien virus had consumed their minds and individual consciences. Mercifully, this virus had not been so effective in the Krajina areas to the north of Knin where opposition to Babić began to grow. But in Knin nobody had a bad word to say about Babić any more and they were all being sincere. I hope I will be able to meet my Croat friends from Knin again some day. More than this, I hope they are still alive.⁴

The Career of Babić, A Serb Leader

Who is this Babić who was the undisputed war leader in Knin and who with the local Serbs would lead his people to one of the Balkan’s most elusive grails – Serbian unity?

4 Ibid.: 19–21.

It was in Knin, some forty miles from Split, that Glenny met Milan Babić, the President of Knin’s Town Council and the *enfant terrible* of Krajina politics. When he, having negotiated two barricades, finally reached Babić’s headquarters in a farmhouse in the village of Strmica he and his guide were “surrounded by several people bearing ostentatious weapons ... I saw a massive machine gun with a circular magazine which was toted by Babić’s personal bodyguard.” During Glenny’s discussion with them on “how these simple Serb peasants [were] traumatized by unscrupulous politicians wishing to realise their politics of nationalist fantasy, a confused tale of real and perceived discrimination emerged.”

At this particular time, this particular part of Croatia, especially Knin and Krajina, was safe country for the rural Serbs, but mostly from hearsay they

... were absolutely convinced that following the victory of Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in April 1990, Croats began to install the infrastructure of a fascist state in Croatia ... the revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was *ipso facto* interpreted by them as the return of fascism.⁵

Babić was a dentist, a first generation professional, who had joined the Croatian Communist Party; and after the collapse of communist power he joined the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which was formed during the early months of 1990. Partly because of his organizational skills as the President of Knin’s Town Council, Babić soon became the second most influential politician to Krajina. Soon afterwards, Babić travelled to Belgrade and his programme of action received the express approval of Milosevic. “The result was the transformation of Krajina’s ragtag shotgun resistance movement into an extremely well-armed and highly motivated militia quite capable of bloodying the nose of Tudjman’s nascent army ...”⁶

Babić had realized “that Knin, the SDS and fears of the rural Serbs in Croatia could be mixed together, and spiked with a potent spirit of violence to make up a recipe for his political success.” And he dared in time to think of territorial autonomy and to advocate for the Serbs of Krajina a policy of secession from Croatia. A self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina duly followed.

The Rape of Women on the Nationalist Battlefield

Let us now turn to another matter that integrally affects the process of creating divides in the context of ethno-nationalist warfare. We are faced with the devastating issue of how the female body has become a public battleground for the pursuit of nationalist objectives which encourage rape, murder, genocide, and dehumanization. Despite the alleged deep animosities between the so-called separatist “nationalists” of former Yugoslavia, and the much touted romanticized notions of exclusive homelands inhabited by racially pure sons of the soil, the ironic countervailing fact is the

5 Glenny 1992: 11–12.

6 Ibid.: 17.

... occurrence of numerous mixed marriages, and mixings and borrowings of tradition between one another, in the Eastern European milieu. Even in the most homogeneous republic, Slovenia, only 73 percent of the children listed on the 1981 census issued from "ethnically pure" Slovenian marriages, while in the most bitterly contested areas of Croatia (e.g., Eastern Slavonija) as many as 35 percent of the 1981 children were from mixed Serb-Croat marriages.⁷

Despite these every day practices that result in large proportions of intermarriage, there is another sociological principle at work, which especially in the context of demanding and affixing an unambiguous identity in these troubled times, works to impose a divide between "us" and the hostile "other." This is the strong male-macho-oriented patriarchal patrilineal principle in this region of Eastern Europe that fixes the identity of children of mixed marriage. In the context of ethnic cleansing, children of mixed marriage seem to be forced to take the father's patrilineal identity, and are coerced together with their parents to flee or stay, to become displaced refugees or remain rightful residents, according to the fortunes of war. The entrenched tradition of patrilineage-affirming feuding and waging vendettas strengthens the use of women merely as pawns in the politics of identity, and merely as possessors of a procreative sexuality appropriated by the nationalist imperative.

Let us now visit the theatre of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a site of brutal violence and of organized abuse of women.

The New York Times, dated Wednesday October 20, 1993, carried this item under the caption "Rape was a Weapon of Serbs, UN Says."⁸

United Nations war crimes commission has found evidence that rape has been used by the Serbs as a weapon of terror in the war in Bosnia.

But the commission says that the number of provable cases of rape may be substantially lower than the 20,000 estimated earlier this year by a committee of the European Community.

The European group in January said that Muslim women were raped by Serbian soldiers as part of their campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in the Bosnia and Herzegovina civil war.

The commission has collected reports of about 3,000 rape cases in its data base at the International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University, Chicago. But the four-member commission has been able to identify only about 800 victims by name.

But on the basis of an examination of the first 330 victims for whom it has names the commission says it is inclined to believe that rape has been used by the Serbs as a weapon of war in their campaign to drive Muslims from their homes and seize their land.

The commission said that although Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim soldiers and the police have all committed rape, the largest number of victims were Muslims and the largest number of perpetrators were Serbs.

The commission points out, in a report issued this week, that most of these cases occurred between May and December last year and in regions where Serbian forces were systematically driving out the Muslims.

It also says that accusations against members of the same military and police units suggests "command responsibility by commission or omission," meaning the soldiers were either encouraged to commit rape by their officers or not punished for doing so.

The commission is now planning to send specialist teams of women into former Yugoslavia to interview rape victims and accumulate more evidence. The commission is also planning to start digging up the mass graves found at Vukovar and Ovchara.

The commission was set up by the United Nations Security Council to start gathering evidence of war crimes in the former Yugoslav federation for use in prosecutions before the Council's war crimes tribunal.

7 These figures are given in Hayden 1991, unpublished. Hayden's revised and elaborated paper has recently been published (see Hayden 1996).

8 Lewis 1993. A few sentences have been deleted.

The commission is due to wind up its work early next year when it will hand over the evidence it has gathered to a special war crimes prosecutor to be appointed by the Security Council. The prosecutor and his own staff of investigators will then seek to develop from this material specific war crimes charges against individuals for trial before the tribunal.

But the tribunal, which is expected to have its headquarters in the Hague, has no power to arrest those charged with war crimes and bring them back there for trial, if they do not agree to go voluntarily.

The assertions of 20,000 rape victims were made in January by a team of European investigators headed by Dame Anne Warburton, a former British representative to the United Nations, and which also include Simone Veil, a prominent French politician, as well as legal and medical experts.

The European investigators, who based their 20,000 figure on estimates by the Croatian Health Ministry in Zagreb and United Nations relief officials working in the field, also maintained the Serbs were using rape as a means of terrorizing Muslim women and driving them from their homes. "Rape cannot be seen as incidental to the main purposes of the aggression but as serving a strategic purpose in itself," the European report said.

Today the European investigators said they will stand by their assessment of the scale of the violation suffered by Muslim women.

"The United Nations War Crimes Commission is rightly taking a restrictive view because it is a legal body preparing charges to present to a court of law," said Ralph Kinnear, a British official who acted as coordinator for Dame Anne's team. "But we felt we had to give our ministers some idea of the probable scale of the crime that had been committed."

Slavenka Draculić, who spoke to refugees in a camp at Resnik (near Zagreb), comprised of mostly Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, confirms what we have said so far about

... the role that mass rape plays in the Serbian program of ethnic cleansing. As Susan Brownmiller and other feminists have pointed out, women have been raped in every war: as retaliation, to damage another man's "property," to send a message to the enemy. Rape is an instrument of war, a very efficient weapon for demoralization and humiliation. In World War II, Russian and Jewish women were raped by Nazis, and Soviet soldiers raped German women by the hundreds of thousands. Chinese women were raped by the Japanese, Vietnamese by Americans. What seems to be unprecedented about the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia (and, to a lesser extent, the Croat women too) is that there is clear political purpose behind the practice. The rapes in Bosnia are not only a standard tactic of war, they are an organized and systematic attempt to cleanse (to move, resettle, exile) the Muslim population from certain territories. Serbs want to conquer in order to establish a Greater Serbia. The eyewitness accounts and reports state that women are raped everywhere and at all times, and victims are of all ages, from six to eighty. They are also deliberately impregnated in great numbers, held captive and released only after abortion becomes impossible. This is so they will "give birth to little Chetniks," the women are told. While Muslim men are killed fighting or exterminated in about one hundred concentration camps, women are raped and impregnated and expelled from their country. Thus not only is their cultural and religious integrity destroyed but the reproductive potential of the whole nation is threatened. Of course, Croats and Muslims have raped Serbian women in Bosnia too, but the Serbs are the aggressors, bent on taking over two-thirds of the territory. This does not justify Croat and Muslim offenses, but they are in a defensive war and do not practice systematic and organized rape.⁹

One commentator reports the voices of raped women and the issues posed by the suddenness of the violence that struck them as follows:

How can there be such barbarity today, in the heart of Europe, in a civilized country, among neighbors and friends? This is a question that hangs over every conversation in Bosnia.

"How was it before the war?" I asked everyone I met, hoping for an explanation.

"Before the war it was super," a thirty-five-year-old Serbian woman, a refugee from Vares, told me without hesitation. "My neighbors were Muslims, Croats. We celebrated all the holidays together.

9 Draculić 1993: 119.

A few months before the war broke out, people started separating. It was after Bosnia's independence was recognized. Our neighbors avoided us. They were blaming the Serbs for the war in Croatia."

"Yesterday we were friends," said a Muslim, a young man of twenty-four, describing how his wife was raped before his eyes by a Serb whom he knew. "I shake when I think of it. I can't believe it happened ... We knew these people; we knew them all. Overnight we became enemies. I don't know why."¹⁰

Fatima, a forty-year-old Muslim nurse, knew some of the men who had abused her when she was imprisoned in an abandoned high school in Doboj, Bosnia, for almost a month beginning last May. One of them was J., a Serbian doctor who was the first to rape her, after he called out her name from a list. "Now you know how strong we are," he told her afterward, "and you will remember it forever. Where is your Izetbegovic now?"

"He was a doctor," Fatima said. "I would have expected him to be different from the others ... *I knew him for ten years*. We were in the same hospital circle. I saw him every day in the restaurant for hospital personnel. We talked, we were acquaintances, I never sensed any hostility. He was a golden guy, refined, polite." (emphasis added)

Ljubica, a thirty-seven-year-old Serbian woman with a pretty freckled face and short dark hair, is one of seven rape victims who have been testifying in Belgrade on behalf of the Serbian government's War Crimes Commission. After her village, near Odzak in Bosnia, came under Croatian shelling on April 18, she moved from one village to another, trying to escape the war. "The Croats came for me at 12:30 AM on June 5," she told me. "They broke down the door of the house and picked me out, made me walk some twenty meters away and said 'now you're going to tell us where the Chetniks are.' There were fifteen of them, *I knew them all they were neighbors*. They call themselves the Fire Horses brigade."¹¹ (emphasis added)

Fatima's testimony that her abuser was a doctor whom she knew for ten years vividly reminds us that such ethnic violence cannot all too easily and temptingly be attributed wholesale to the criminal elements, urban lumpen proletariat, rustic louts smelling of the pigs they rear, or the mentally deformed. The doctor knew exactly what he was doing: whatever the (pathologically) erotic pleasure of rape, the inescapable truth about rape as one of the instruments of ethnic cleansing is that this form of ethnic violence is perpetrated by males upon the bodies of women, bodies which in turn signify so much. Rape as macho behavior is a primary form of male violence practiced in the service of political domination; in attacking and impregnating the women the woman is degraded, despoiled, violated and in the context of 'patriarchal' values of purity and pollution as the special sensitivities and burdens of women, rape is also an attack on the family, on the reproduction of the family, and on male pride in patriliney. As Laber puts it, any explanation of these forms of rape in terms of being "the expression of pent-up sexual desire and thus apolitical in nature, a 'private crime' ... fails to recognize rape for what is, a brutal show of power and aggression not only towards women but also against vanquished men."¹² To this we may add, that reports that Serbian men who raped Muslim women and kept them in captivity for several weeks until the foetus is formed and thereby ensuring the birth of children of Serb fathers is the latest twist in the employment of patrilineal male dominant kinship systems in the service of nationalism.¹³

We shall deal with the experiences of rape and their effects on female victims shortly. Here the main point of focus is that in the context of ethnic politics valorized

10 Laber 1993: 3-6.

11 Laber 1993: 3.

12 Ibid.: 3.

13 It has also been reported that Serbian forces have held Bosnian women in brothel-like conditions, impregnated them through serial rape, and not released them until their pregnancy was too advanced for abortion. In other cases, pregnant victims themselves were unable to get abortions because of the unavailability of the necessary services.

in this way the fact that many rapists were known persons who, shifting from the mores of everyday practice and etiquette, assumed and unleashed violence under the thrall of a felt collective demonizing and everyday taboo-lifting imperative sheds some light, however murky, on their behavior. This particular trail may lead us to the political and territorial ambitions of leaders such as Milosevic of the Serbs, Tudjman of the Croats, Karadzic of the Bosnian Serbs, and their ethno-nationalist followers who have broadcast manipulative propaganda, rumours and invented ‘evidence,’ mobilized the masses for action, and sown both collective fears and generated collective rage that have demonized the enemy, and justified their domination, displacement, degradation and elimination.

They aim to terrorize, and the methods follow a formula that has been repeated in a number of different regions of the former Yugoslavia: cold-blooded killings of men, women, and children; bodies dumped in hastily bulldozed communal graves; apartments, homes, and villages looted and burned; forced deportations; torture and abuse of detainees; rape.¹⁴

The Silence of Women

Draculić has reported how “reporters, feminist activists, UN officials, European Community delegates, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International envoys,” all of them usually run “into a wall of silence” when they try to get the raped women to talk of what happened to them.

The matter is more complicated than outsiders realize. That their cases might provide evidence against war criminals is not the main concern of these women. They barely survived the terror of the war; many have lost family members or have had husbands and sons who are still fighting there – or are held in concentration camps or have disappeared and it’s not known if they are alive or dead. If the women talk, they could jeopardize the men’s lives. Besides, once they are safely out of Bosnia, they want to forget what happened to them as quickly as possible. The third, and perhaps most important, reason is that they want to hide it. Even though each woman is one among the many victims of a mass rape, what happened to them is in the domain of unspeakable things, the ultimate humiliation and shame. The invisible scars are never going to heal, but it is better if they can hide their hurt and shame from others, even relatives and neighbors ... Under normal conditions only one out of ten rape victims reports the crime. Why would women who are raped in wartime be more forthcoming? Most of the victims are Muslims from strongly patriarchal communities; they simply do not want to revive the pain they went through. I asked one if the women talk about it amongst themselves. No, she said, they prefer to face it all alone.¹⁵

Thus what happens is that women who at all costs do not want to talk in the presence of men form a secret, silent, frightened underground network who might know one another’s misery but prefer to hide it. A thirty-year-old woman raped by four Serbian boys, allegedly ‘normal’ boys from the nearby Serbian village, confessed

After all these months I cannot get rid of a feeling of carrying some kind of visible stamp, of being dirty, physically dirty and guilty ... Under no condition would I return to live in the same village with Serbs as before ... In fact, I would not even live in the same state as them.¹⁶

14 Ibid.: 3.

15 Draculić 1993: 113.

16 Draculić 1993: 119.

Purging the Unwanted Experience

Melissa Caldwell reports these words of a girl of 16 years of age, Enisa, who was raped by some Serb Chetniks: "It seemed as if I were in a state of non-existence, simultaneously dead and alive, on the thin line between consciousness and madness."¹⁷

Caldwell then reminds us that Elaine Scarry has argued that the intense pain of torture is the moment at which the victim's "world, self, and voice are lost, the moment when they are also appropriated and manipulated by those of the torturer."¹⁸

It would be unrealistic to think that one can represent or report on the felt experiences of all or even the vast majority of raped women – the information is not simply available or easy to elicit – but one pattern of reported experiences illuminates how the raped women must of necessity transform that experience into the alien "other" that can thereby be detached and eliminated from their own selves. These women in order to reassume their lives must reconvert the intrusive rape into an extruded other. These passages taken from Caldwell illustrate this point:¹⁹

One journalist who interviewed numerous rape victims reported that "women who have been raped will tell you that it often takes a long time to feel whole again."²⁰ Several young women whose testimonies were collected by a relief worker found it difficult to recall the actual event of rape, and described it in a very detached manner, calling to mind again Scarry's definition of the goal of torture: to "destroy language, the power of verbal objectification."²¹ Mirsada, a 17-year-old woman serially raped in a Chetnik camp recounted her experience in this way:

"They raped us every night ... There were nights when more than 20 of them came. They did all kinds of things to us. I don't want to remember ... I want to forget everything. I cannot live with these memories. I will go insane."²²

In another account, 15-year-old Azra reported: "They [the Chetniks] ordered us to walk in a circle. Then it started. They all approached one girl and started on her. This took place on a rock in the yard ... I fell. Then the *worst* happened." [Ibid. 13]

In yet another chilling testimony, 16-year-old Enisa described her rape:

"He ordered me to undress. I took off my clothes, feeling that I was falling apart. The feeling seemed under my skin. I was dying, my entire being was murdered. I closed my eyes. I cried, twisted my body convulsively, bled. I had been a virgin." [Ibid. 13]

These accounts, then, support the imagery of a fragmented body and self, and suggest that rape victims are able to reappropriate their identities and bodies only by first rejecting them. By making that part of themselves disappear, as the rejected other so they can create themselves anew. Other images of purging appear in the accounts of women impregnated by Serb soldiers. One young woman referred to the child in her womb only as a foreign object, as "that thing" or "that curse."²³ Another young woman, who had already signed papers giving up her Serb-fathered child for adoption, told a journalist, "I don't feel anything towards this child ... My feelings towards this child are like my feelings toward this wall. This child I do not want."²⁴ By freeing themselves of these burdens, women such as these two can move towards reclaiming their bodies. [Here end the passages taken from Caldwell.]

17 Caldwell 1997, unpublished. I thank her for allowing me to quote her essay.

18 Scarry. 1985: 35, 54.

19 Caldwell 1997, unpublished.

20 Quindlen 1993: A19.

21 Scarry 1985: 54.

22 Minderovic 1993: 12–13.

23 Horvath 1996: 11–12.

24 Eggerston 1993: 22.

The Nation-State Making Projects of Tadjman and Milosevic

Babić, whom we projected on our screen earlier, was himself only a provincial leader who mobilized the local Serbs living in a corner of Croatia. His own mobilization of parochial rural Serbs for armed action against the hated Croatian 'Ustashas' was a process that has to be situated within the larger imperial projects of two men, mirror images of each other, determined to bring into being two separate republics – Croatia and Serbia – by making one the quintessential enemy of the other. These two men are Franjo Tadjman and Slobodan Milosevic to whose Fascist designs in the name of the *narod*, and whose 'romantic nationalism' exuding the poison gas of 'racism' and 'ethnic cleansing' we now turn.

A Belgrade actor, Boro Todorovic, posed this despairing question which comes alive in the context of the dismantling of the Yugoslav communist regime, and the alleged substitution for it of the much touted political and economic 'democratization' and 'marketization.'

To what end, and in whose name, I ask myself ... this senseless nationalist imperative, which enforces membership in a nation to which you are driven and in which you are instructed by those who until yesterday were champions of the League of Communists, fighters for brotherhood and unity, secretaries of various committees from the commune to the Central Committee?²⁵

It is well known that the component groups of the former Yugoslavia have a long history of differences and rivalries as well as intermixtures and minglings.

Slovenia and Croatia were originally part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia part of the Ottoman Empire. Yugoslavia had in 1990 six republics and two autonomous provinces. An ethnically diverse country of some twenty four million people, the main ethnic groups are Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslim Slavs, Albanians and Greeks (in Macedonia). Croats and Slovenes are Roman Catholic; they also in large measure collaborated with the German Nazi regime during the second world war. The Serbs are affiliated with the Eastern Orthodox Church, and sided with the Communists in the War, and afterwards came to dominate the communist government that was established. The Croats and Serbs speak a common language but use different scripts – the Roman and Cyrillic, respectively. The memories both groups have of the second world war are very bitter indeed, and with the break of Yugoslavia today the Serbs and Croats are aggressively following their aggrandizing policies in the name of ethno-nationalism, opposing each other and also participating in the dismemberment of Bosnia.

There are many divisive allegiances and interests that plague the different ethnic peoples and the multiple republics of Yugoslavia. What I want to highlight here is that while Yugoslavia's ethnic groups have their geographical concentrations in different republics, (Slovenes in Slovenia, Croats in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia), sizeable numbers are also dispersed outside these boundaries and constitute significant minorities elsewhere. The largest ethnic group, the Serbs, who dominated the federal government and are concentrated in Serbia, have, however some 50,000 of their people located in

25 Quoted by Glenny 1992 in Preface.

Slovenia and a much larger number, 2,000,000, living in Croatia, most of them in its southeast. (The mix of ethnic nationalities in the republics and provinces other than Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia is greater.)

It is on this kind of historically complex, demographically intermixed and culturally divisive as well as intersecting landscape that nationalist ideologues such as Tadjman and Milosevic and others have decided to carve out and impose their ethno-nationalist states with their separate territories and majoritarian domination.

I need not rehearse here the recent parliamentary elections in the republics and the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, which have repudiated communism, the resistance put up by procommunist Serbia, which controls the national army, to these secessions, and the Serbian invasion of Croatia allegedly to secure the interests of fellow Serbs in danger there and on whose behalf Serbia demanded special guarantees. Now consider what is at stake in Kosovo province in Yugoslavia, ridden with tensions between Serbs and Albanians. Serbia has also annexed this province, where Albanians outnumber Serbs by more than 10:1. And most recently, the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has exploded in violence as it peruses its independence in the face of resistance offered by Serb-led army garrisons. Bosnia and Herzegovina have the deadly mix, in a total population of 4.3 million, of Muslim Slavs, who make up 44 per cent of the population, Roman Catholic Croats, who make up 18 per cent, with the remainder, Eastern Orthodox Serbs, constituting 31 per cent. UN peacekeeping troops have already intervened to defuse the strife in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but so far with little success. Serbian troops, both local and governmental are now engaged in attacking Sarajevo and driving out or decimating the Muslim Slavs. There are also signs that old enmities are breaking out in Macedonia.

In the concluding part of this essay I propose to discuss the ideological ingredients and suppositions of the ethno-nationalist projects of Tadjman and Milosevic and the techniques they have employed to implant separatist identities and the policies they have devised to separate out and obliterate the ethnic 'others' while striving to enforce a Croatian or Serbian political hegemony.

I have already stated elsewhere²⁶ that the ethno-nationalist proclamations of Tadjman and Milosevic remind us of the 'racial' rhetoric of the Third Reich, which again was a dangerous distortion and perversion of Johann Gottfried Herder's romantic philosophy of the "Volksgeist."

Now the remarkable feature of Herder's conception of Volksgeist, or of 'ethno-nationalism' in my jargon, was that while being deeply infused with historical, cultural, linguistic collective memories and consciousness, it was not *political* in orientation, and was totally opposed to the aggressive nationalism of the nation-state. Herder denounced every form of centralization of political power and the coercion and violence that went with it. "Nature" creates "nations," not "states," and the basis of the state is conquest.

Herder's vision of a people fused into some kind of organic whole by historical memory, language and literature and cultural productions was as we have underscored before not a conception of a political nationalism coupled to a territorial bounded

26 Tambiah 1992, unpublished. This essay has been published with some alterations (see Tambiah 1996).

state but of pluralistic 'cultures' of 'organic' collectivities following their own historical development.

But it took only a certain twist for this notion of a distinctive people to be transformed in the hands of National Socialism and its Fascist Nazi propagandists to a demonic philosophy of Aryan racial superiority and to discrimination against allegedly dangerous and sinister minorities living among majority populations and their expulsion from the fatherland or their extermination in death camps. The politicization of ethno-nationalism and the imposition of an ethno-nationalist state representing an intolerant majority on a pluralistic terrain spawns violence and warfare. Though Hitler and his associates were the arch exponents of this pathological philosophy of racial superiority and special destiny, leading eventually to imperial expansion and subordination of 'inferior' peoples, some of these same attitudes and conceptions of ethno-nationalism have been operative among many of the ethnic nationalities of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, and have today broken out in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania (which are in the process of fragmenting) and in many of the previous Soviet republics among which the Armenian-Azerbaijani hostilities are the most vicious.

Consider now the philosophy of political ethno-nationalism propounded by Franjo Tudjman, who is currently President of Croatia. In a text published in English in 1981 under the title *Nationalism and Contemporary Europe*, Tudjman binds the *narod* (ethnic nation) explicitly to the *state*; the ethnic nation is imaged as a collective individual defined by shared physical substance, a far cry from the theory of individualism that is the cornerstone of the West European nation-state. This collective ethno-nationalism entails the view that all persons share in one homogenized ethnic identity. The rights of political self-determination are vested in the collectivity, and it is this collective entitlement that constitutes national sovereignty. The positing of a "total national sovereignty" of this kind is the high road to nation-state chauvinism.

Tudjman's own words are unambiguous about *narod* as the amalgam of collective homogeneity and sovereignty. He writes:

Nations ... grow up in a natural manner ... as a result of the development of all those material and spiritual forces which in a given area shape the national being of individual nations on the basis of blood, linguistic and cultural kinship.²⁷

Again Tudjman writes:

Every nation, no matter what its size or character, has the natural and historic right to its sovereignty and its place in the human community, just as the individual has in society ... only a free and sovereign nation, like a fully developed and free human being, can give its full contribution to the world.²⁸

Tudjman's views are not unique or peculiarly Croatian. Tudjman's major opponent, President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, also rallies his people in the name of an inflammatory ethnic nationalism. Milosevic, and his Serbian associates, in their latest assault on the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (who comprise 42 per cent of

27 Tudjman 1981: 10. I am indebted to Hayden 1991 for these quotes.

28 Ibid. 289.

the population), have begun to preach the deadly policy of 'ethnic-cleansing' – that is the slaughter and driving out of Muslims so that in the end there will be only Serbs in areas that were once mixed. The Serb strategy is aimed first at forcing Muslims out of mixed towns, and then isolating the remaining pockets of Muslims. As of July 31, 1992, some 700,000 people had been driven out of Bosnia since the war began earlier that year. The horrors perpetrated in Bosnia in the name of ethnic cleansing should twinge the consciences of other ethno-nationalist groups in other countries who in the name of a fictive racial purity or of being equally fictive sons of the soil or of an invented exclusive homeland drive from their midst neighbors of a different ethnic identity. What is ironic and myopic about these assertions of ethnic homogenization and cleansing as fact and as a nationalist goal is the occurrence of numerous mixed marriages, and mixings and borrowings of tradition between one another, in the Eastern European milieu.

Tudjman's "greatest obsession was the creation of a state which would be identified with the Croatian people." In Tudjman's eyes, this state making required the display of Croatian nationalist iconography – especially the hanging of the red and white chequered shield, the *Sabovnica*, the core of Croatian heraldry, from every building; it meant demoting the Serbs from their status within Croatia as a majority Yugoslav nation – as in Tito's time – to that of a minority nation within Croatia; and

... it entailed pronouncing literary Croat as the only language of administration in Croatia and dismissing the Serb's Cyrillic script as well. The move was as senseless as it was provocative. According to moderate Knin Serbs I met in 1990, only about 5 per cent of the local Serbs used Cyrillic script, the rest not only spoke the Croatian variant, they used the Latin script. Eighteen months later, on my return, I witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of a Knin Serb attempting to write the address of his relations in Belgrade in Cyrillic ...²⁹

Tudjman later compounded the issue by decreeing that biscriptual signs in Latin and Cyrillic be replaced with Latin ones alone.

Under the complicated calculations and policies of the Tito regime, the Serbs in Croatia, especially in the cities, occupied a disproportionately high number of posts in the state administration; and in the Croat state and the party bureaucracy Serb officials had been dominant. President Tudjman decided to 'rectify' matters by requiring nationality as a criterion for employment, and this resulted in a number of Serbs being declared redundant in the administration of Croatia.

When the militant dogs of the HDZ were unleashed and allowed to organize purges of the state administration, Serbs throughout Croatia were shaken by the spectre of persecution. When the HDZ government attempted to start redressing the imbalance in the police forces where Serbs dominated, the spectre of persecution was able to invoke their worst nightmare: the return of Ustasas, the Croat fascists.

With every provocative decision taken by Zagreb, the people of Knin were driven faster towards the heart of darkness, the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Prince Milosevic.³⁰

29 Glenny 1992: 12.

30 Glenny 1992: 14.

The Serbian thrust towards its own form of nationalism paralleled that of the Croatian.

The great motor behind Serbian nationalist politics is the search for unity. The most powerful form of Serbian iconography is the symmetrical cross adorned with four Cs (the Cyrillic letter S), the two left-hand ones being printed as mirror images. This is an acronym for the phrase *Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava* (Only Unity Can Save the Serb). Serbian society is in fact driven by provincial rivalry and suspicion, and the assumption of Serbs that a state which encompasses all of them as one nation can overcome all major social and economic evils is an illusion.

This was Misha Glenny’s reading of the Serbian situation in 1992.

We have already reviewed the perpetration of rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a strategy of warfare and as part of the policy of ethnic cleansing and even genocide. These are entailments of an extreme cultivation and imposition of a collective phobia of ‘species’ and ‘racial homogeneity.’ As Michel Foucault would put it, the systematic infliction of rape on women, of displacement and expulsion of people, of genocide and killing the enemy, of changing the blood of the ‘other,’ these are all focused on “the two poles of biopower,” on the one hand the conception of a ‘species body’ and a ‘biopolitics of the population,’ and on the other the conception of the individual body as a machine which produces various “utilities,” the “anatomic politics of the human body.” “Sex as a political issue,” Foucault said,

... was at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life. On the one hand, it was applied to the disciplines of the body ... on the other hand, it was applied to the regulation of populations.³¹

Foucault chillingly asserts,

If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.³²

Milosevic and Tudjman as the generals of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms as collective “species” projects for ensuring for the future are willing in the present time to shed the blood of their youth. The mothers who have given birth to these same youth are always the unflinching questioners of this sacrifice at the altar of the fatherland and the exposers of the symbolics of blood and the honor of war. Melissa Caldwell provides a vivid account of the confrontation between the Mother’s Movement (Women’s Uprising) and the generals:

In July 1991, several hundred Serbian mothers of federal army draftees broke into the parliament building in Belgrade and interrupted the session of parliament, demanding the return of their sons from the war. Protesting “the war and the abuse of their reproductive labor by the state, the army, and the party,”³³ the mothers pushed through the building shouting such slogans as “Generals are killers” and “We don’t want our sons to die for generals,” and accusing the generals of using their children for “cannon fodder.”³⁴ In support, a Croatian mothers’ movement marched on Zagreb, only to be met by

31 Foucault 1978, Vol. 1: 135–149. In the focus on the species body, “the body [is] imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity ...” (Foucault 1978, Vol. 1: 139).

32 Foucault 1978, Vol. 1: 137.

33 Zajovic 1993: 16.

34 Draculić 1991: 12–13.

President Franjo Tudjman, who told them, "I'm very proud that you demand you sons' return from the federal army ... but I am proud that you are giving them to Croatia's national guard to protect our homeland."³⁵ These women, then, are attempting to remove from the authorities their control over sex as "a thing to be ... managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all."³⁶

We have seen how the romantic and politically intoxicating transmutation of the *narod* into an ethnonationalist state has inevitably spawned in a ruptured Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Europe, the horror of recently liberated 'minorities,' having become 'majorities' in their newly carved states, in turn discriminating against, inferiorizing, expelling, and killing their own 'minorities.'

It is also clear, however, that the drive for the imagined and desired 'homogeneous' Serb nation or Croat nation, and subsequently the Bosnian-Muslim nation, is difficult to consummate and doomed to be contentious and fractious because of multiple internal contests and differences and cross-cutting interests. And this situation may also engender a process that Girard has elaborated in *Violence and the Sacred*:³⁷ the internal divisiveness and conflicts within a group or collectivity may drive its members to seek out a scapegoat and "sacrificially" kill it to gain its own uncertain unity, and make of this cleansing a sacred act of generative unanimity and duty. I have previously suggested that the targeted and victimized enemy next door usually shares much content and texture with the aggressor's own make up, and therefore the expulsion or annihilation of that enemy may be a substitution for the enemy one harbours within oneself, and that this may account for the overdetermined brutality and the guiltless obliteration of the 'other.' Thus, culturally plural societies may shatter into antagonistic political fragments, when nationalities seek to become autonomous states.

But there is the power and play of another cluster of technologies to consider in determining outcomes. This is the enormously effective use of the media, the radio and television, audio and videocassettes (and now no doubt the computer and e-mail) to bombard the public with potent and mischievous propaganda, sinister rumours and character assassinations. The Tudjmans, the Milosevics, the Bihacs and the Karadjics, and their lieutenants and cadres are skillful and relentless users of both the media to intensify emotions and the guns to terrorize and cause physical damage. The information and communication revolution of our time, and the reach of its surveillance, has its parallel in the world wide free market trade and accessibility of the most sophisticated weapons of death.

Regarding the power of the manipulated media, Milos Vasia, a founding editor of the independent weekly newspaper *VREME* has said:

It's an artificial war, really, produced by television. All it took was a few years of fierce, reckless, chauvinist, intolerant, expansionist, war-mongering propaganda to create enough hate to start the fighting among people who had lived together peacefully for forty-five years. I acknowledge that noses were broken in bar-rooms over the years, but nobody was killed. You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial line – a line dictated by David Duke. You, too would have a war in five years.³⁸

35 Draculić 1991: 13.

36 Foucault 1979: 24.

37 Girard 1979.

38 *New Yorker*, March 15, 1993.

But once again there are twists to our narrative; twists, reversals, and dialectics that complicate the simpler Girardian story line. If war-mongering propaganda employs rumours that demonize the enemy, it might be the case – as I have discovered in my investigation of similar ethnic conflicts in South Asia – that it is usually the locally dominant aggressors who hatch and circulate stereotyped rumors that demonize their victims, and at the same time these rumours invest the beleaguered victims with exaggerated powers and fiendish plans to attack the attackers and to annihilate them. Thus these rumors which are compounded of a spiralling intertwining of rage against the enemy as well as fear of his retaliation, and which provoke a relentless redoubled attack of the enemy in turn, might be seen as another manifestation of that process we have tracked before – the negative propensities of the enemy within, who is also displaced as the enemy without. These dialectical processes sustain a runaway inflation of violence.

The following passages graphically illustrate the conversion of the victim into the aggressor and crediting him with extremist designs. Misha Glenny is here quoting as account by another journalist, Andrej Gustincic of Reuters, who managed to enter the town of Foca which the Serbs overtook as they tightened the noose around Sarajevo’s neck:

Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foca, turning the once quiet Bosnian town into a nightmare landscape of shattered streets and burning houses. The motley assortment of fierce-looking bearded men carry Kalashnikovs and bandoliers or have handguns tucked into their belts. Some are members of paramilitary groups from Serbia, self-proclaimed crusaders against Islam and defenders of the Serbian nation, others are wild-eyed local men, hostile towards strangers and happy to have driven out their Moslem neighbors.

The Moslems, who made up half the town’s population of 10,000 people, have fled or are in jail. Many of their houses have been destroyed or are in flames. The Serbs say the Moslems began it. A feverish distrust of all that is not Serbian and a conviction that they have narrowly escaped genocide at the hand of Islamic fundamentalists has gripped Foca’s Serbs.

“Do you see that field?” asks a Serbian woman, pointing to a sloping meadow by the Drina river. “The jihad (Moslem Holy War) was supposed to begin there. Foca was going to be the new Mecca. There were lists of Serbs who were marked for death,” the woman says, repeating a belief held by townspeople and gunmen. “My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape.” None of them have seen the lists but this does not prevent anyone from believing in them unquestioningly.³⁹

Coda

In a provocative essay with an even more provocative title “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” Charles Tilly asserts:

If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime. Without branding all generals and statesmen as murderers or thieves, I want to urge the value of that analogy. At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.⁴⁰

39 Glenny 1992: 166–167.

40 Tilly 1994: 169.

Tilly illustrates the analogy of war making with organized crime from a few hundred years of European experience from the sixteenth century onwards. He argues that “coercive exploitation played a large part in the creation of European states,” and that if the definition of a racketeer is “someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction,” then “government’s provision of protection, by this standard, qualifies as racketeering.” Governments stand out from other protection organizations by their “tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.”⁴¹ Tilly enumerates four different activities as those which the agents of states characteristically carry on under the general activity of organized violence:

1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force;
2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories;
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients;
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making and protection.⁴²

It is clear that these same strategies and processes are evident in the Eastern Europe of the last decade of the twentieth century. It would seem that both Tadjman in his drive to create a unified Croatia, and Milosevic pursuing his even grander project of “Greater Serbia,” have systematically engaged in them. On the one hand, the above-mentioned strategies and activities have been focused on their respective states’ attempted eradication or subordination of internal rivals, be they alleged or real “ethnic minorities,” or liberal opponents of authoritarian rule and warmongering. On the other hand, they have also taken care to protect and distribute benefits to their own supporters, while enticing the support of other power-holders in the society by eliminating their rivals. One additional aspect of this state making is the ensuring that the courts and criminal justice system, and those representative assemblies that are allowed to function are actually accessible to clients and pliant interest groups and provide the necessary protection from their enemies. Finally, these strategies and solutions of internal domestication are extended outwards into “external” territory in newly captured regions. Serbian activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide the necessary illustrations as rural Serbs attack the privileged urban population of Sarajevo, and in time this city’s cosmopolitan population loses its unity as it progressively fractures into Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims who find little left to defend together as war making, state making, and protection rackets coincide and fuse.

41 Tilly 1994: 170, 171.

42 Tilly 1994: 181.

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